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Abandonment of Oil and Gas Leases
MAURICE H. MERRILL*

In judicially declaring that the mutual rights and obligations
created by an oil and gas lease have come to an end, the court having
jurisdiction of the matter frequently declares that the life of the
lease has been terminated by "abandonment" on the part of the
lessee. This term is, apparently, both fascinating and convenient.

It has readily been accepted by judges and practitioners, sometimes,
it is feared, without their giving sufficient attention to its applicability to the case at hand. The situations to which it has been applied
may be classified into three distinct groups. It is the belief of the
writer that only one of these groups involves abandonment in the
proper legal sense, and that the use of the term in cases of the other

two types is lax, confusing and productive of undesirable consequences. In the succeeding discussion an attempt will be made to
give the reasons for this belief.

I
First let us consider the cases which involve abandonment in the
proper sense. Title to land, it is settled, cannot be lost by abandonment.' If the right asserted to land "is the valid legal title, it is inconceivable how it can be abandoned." 2 But the interest of the lessee
under an oil and gas lease stands upon quite a different footing. The
right granted by the "lease" is merely to search for oil and gas and,
if either is found, to remove it from the land. It is, therefore, a
profit &prendre.' As such, it is an incorporeal hereditament 4 and title
thereto may therefore be lost by abandonment. 5
In order that title may be lost by abandonment, two things are

*0 the faculty of the University of Idaho College of Law.
'See 3 Washburn, Real Property, 77. See also i Corpus Juris io, and cases
there
cited.
2
East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Wiggin, 68 Fed. 446 (1895).
3
See note on "The Nature of Rights Involved in an Oil and Gas Lease," 31
Ear. L. Rev. 882; James W. Simonton, "The Nature of the Interest of the
Grantee under an Oil and Gas Lease," 25 W. Va. L. Q. 295; James A. Veasey,
"The Law of Oil and Gas," I8 Mich. L. Rev. 749, 773; 2 Tiffany, Real Property,
2nd ed., 1397.
4

See cases cited in Kulp, Cases on Oil and Gas, IO6, note. See also Kolachny v.

Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772 (1910), 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 451; and Rich v. Doneghey,
71 Olda. 204 (1918), 3 A. L. R. 352.
5

"Title to land cannot be lost by abandonment, notwithstanding the dictum
of one learned judge to the contrary. *** But it is otherwise of easements and
incorporeal hereditaments." 3 Washburn, Real Property, 6th ed., 77. "The
doctrine of abandonment * * * has to do with incorporeal hereditaments."
Thompson, Title to Real Property, 131.
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necessary. There must be an intention on the part of the owner to
' 6
relinquish his title and also "a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act
7
done in pursuance of and evidencing this intention. The intent to
abandon and the act of relinquishment must concur.8 "The relinquishment must be actual and the abandonment intentional."9
In the case of oil and gas leases, the "act" of abandonment need
not necessarily involve the positive "doing" of something by the
lessee. There are, of course, cases of that sort. The lessee may
remove his machinery from the premises, tear down the rig, "pull"
the casing from the wells, cease to pump oil from producing wells, all
in pursuance of the intention to give up his interest under the lease.10
On the other hand, the "act" of abandonment is frequently no more
than negative conduct, such as a failure to take possession under the
lease" or, if done with the necessary intention, a failure to comply
with the obligations, express or implied, imposed by that instrument. 12
The important element, however, the characteristic which distinguishes the termination of a lease by abandonment from other
forms of putting an end to the relation between the lessor and the
lessee, is the intention on the part of the lessee to give up his interest
under the lease.3 If this intention is absent, then there is no abandonment of the lease,14 although the lessee may have been remiss in
the performance of the duties imposed upon him thereunder. 5 Hence,
eSee Charleston, S. C. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. American Agricultural Chemical
Co., 126 Tenn. I8 (I9II).

7See
cases cited i Corpus juris 6.
8
Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Whited, 8I Okla. 45 (1921).
9Cadillac Oil & Gas Co. v. Harrison, 196 Ky. 290 (1922).
1°For cases of this type see Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 53 W. Va.
501 (19o3); Stage v. Boyer, 183 Pa. 56o (1898); Calhoon v. Neely, 201 Pa. 97
(1902).

"See Barnhart v. Lockwood,

152

Pa.

82 (1892);

Crawford v. Ritchey, 43

W. Va. 252 (1897); Smith v. Root, 66 W. Va. 633 (910), 30 L. R. A. (N. S.)176.
uSee Roesener v. Burdette, 208 Ky. 137 (1925); holding that an abandonment
was shown where lessee, after notice that lessor refused to accept delay rental,
made no effort to develop the property nor took any "steps to assert his rights"
for over two years; and Harris v. Riggs, 63 Ind. App. 201 (1916). See also cases
cited
in notes 39-42, 55, infra.
3
"Abandonment consists of two parts, the intention and the act. *** There
must be an absence of anirnus revertendi in order to constitute abandonment."
Hall
v. McClesky, 288 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 1004. (1921).
4
As to the importance of intent in abandonment generally, see Baglin v.
Cusenier Co., 221 U. S. 58o (1911). The court there says: "There must be found
an intent to abandon, or the property is not lost * * *."
16Luman v. Davis, IO8 Kan. 8oi (1921); Sugg. v. Williams, 191 Ky. 188 (1921);
Cadillac Oil & Gas Co. v. Harrison, supra,n. 9; Trammel Creek Oil & Gas Co. v.
Sarver, i97 Ky. 594 (1923); Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla. I (1920); Hall v. Roberts,
-Tex. Civ. App.-(I92I), 228 S. W. ioo8; Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co.,Tex. Civ. App.-(1923), 253 S. W. 908; Stitz v. National Producing & Refining
Co.,-Tex. Civ. App.-(1923), 247 S. W. 657; Sult v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co.,
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it has been held, in alleging an abandonment, the lessor must not only
set forth acts on the part of the lessee, such as removal of drilling
machinery, etc., from the property without "productive development,"
but must also allege that these acts were done with intent to abandon
the premises. 16 A temporary cessation of operations under the lease,
though intentional, does not constitute an abandonment, in the ab17
sence of the necessary purpose to give up all rights thereunder.
The application of the principle extends even further. An intention
to hold the lease without engaging in work of exploration or development, not being an intention to give up the rights conferred by the
lease, does not constitute the purpose required for abandonment. 8
Delay in exploration, development or operation may, under principles hereafter discussed, terminate the lease or make it forfeitable at
the will of the lessor, but does not of itself constitute an abandonment.
It is sometimes said that an unexplained delay in carrying on operations under the lease is evidence of abandonment. 19 This, however,
does not mean that intention is disregarded in determining whether
an abandonment has taken place. The true meaning of such a statement is that the failure to exercise the rights conferred by the lease is
some indication of an intention to give them up. If uncontradicted
by other evidence, it may well be considered sufficient to sustain a
finding of the existence of such an intention, but this is merely an infer63 W. Va. 317 (i9o8); Garrett v. South Penn Oil Co., 66 W. Va. 587 (1909);
Phillips v. Hamilton, 17 Wyo. 41 (I9O8); Douglas Oil Fields v. Hamilton, 17
Wyo. 54 (19o8). The Supreme Court of Texas, in Grubb v. McAfee, IO9 Tex.
527 (1919), appeared to consider, contrary to the decisions cited above from the
several Courts of Civil Appeals, that intention to abandon was not indispensable
to abandonment, but the recent case of Wisconsin-Texas Oil Co. v. Clutter,268 S. W. (Tex.) 921 (1925), clearly makes intentional relinquishment a necessary element thereof.
""Abandonment depends on intention and conduct, and the conduct charged,
standing alone, does not negative intention to fulfill the purpose of the grant."
Luman v. Davis, 108 Kan. 801 (I921).
17Sugg. v. Williams, supra, n. I5; Trammel Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Sarver,
sispra, n. 15.
"8Southwestern Oil Co. v. McDaniel, 71 Okla. 142 (i918), holding that exercise
of option to pay delay rental in lieu of drilling is not an abandonment; Buie v.
Porter, - 228 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 999 (1921); Lane v. Urbahn, - 265
S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 1O63 (1924); Reserve Gas Co. v. Carbon Black Mfg. Co.,
72 W. Va. 757 (1913).
"An unexplained cessation of operations for the period involved in this case
gives rise to a fair presumption of abandonment, and, standing alone and admitted, would justify the court in declaring an abandonment as matter of law."
Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 193 Pa. 451 (1899),

"The verynatureofthecontract

would seem to raise a presumption of abandonment when there is unreasonable
delay in doing under the lease what the parties originally contemplated should
be done under it." Harris v. Michael, 70 W. Va. 356 (1912). "An unexplained
cessation of operations may give rise to a fair presumption of abandonment, * * *." Strange v. Hicks, supra, n. 15. See also Barnhart v. Lockwood,
supra, n. ii; Hall v. McClesky, supra, n. 13; Hall v. Roberts, supra, n. 15.
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ence, rebuttable by showing a contrary intention.2 0 The lessee may
testify that he did not mean to abandon the premises. 21 His testimony will not, of course, be conclusive. His actual conduct at the
time may be resorted to for the purpose of indicating the existence of
intent to abandon2 Such an intention, notwithstanding present
protestations to the contrary, may be inferred from a failure to comply with the implied covenants of the lease2 ' or with its express provisions, though not specified as a ground of forfeiture in the instrument.24 On the other hand, the lessee's conduct may be such as to
'
negative the presumption arising from "unexplained delay." 2
It seems clear, then, that abandonment of an oil and gas lease, like
abandonment of other property, requires the concurrence of a definite
act of abandonment and an intention to relinquish all claims to the
property. If the intention is absent, there is no abandonment,
though the conduct of the lessee may have brought the lease to an
2
end or rendered it subject to forfeiture upon some other ground.
II
Many cases present a state of facts in which, by virtue of its express
terms, the lease has either expired or has become subject to forfeiture
at the option of the lessor. A brief summary of the more common
situations may make the above statement more concrete. For instance, the duration of the lease may be made to depend upon a given
contingency, which has taken place. The lease is thereupon terminated.2 7 Most modem leases contain a provision for the payment
2
0"The * * * cessation of operations may, however, be satisfactorily explained."
Strange
v. Hicks, supra, n. 15.
21
Bartley v. Phillips, 179 Pa. 175 (1897). See also Hall v. Roberts, supra,n. 15.
n"In business transactions a man's intention is to be gathered from * * * his
conduct, rather than from what he meditates, if the latter is inconsistent with
the former." Logan Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v. Great Southern Gas & Oil Co.,

x26 Fed. 623 (1903).

2"In view of this implied agreement to use diligence in making development,
the failure to do so * * * becomes a potent element of proof of intention to abandon."
Smith v. Root, supra, n. xi.
2
1Crawford v. Ritchey, supra, n. II.
nConduct held to have this effect: Sale of interest in lease, Fisher v. Crescent
Oil Co., 178 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 9o5 (1915). Demand to be allowed to sell
interests in the lease, Lane v. Urbahn, supra, n. 18. Payment of delay rental,
Reserve Gas Co. v. Carbon Black Mfg. Co., supra, n. 18.
261t has been said that it is not necessary that the existence of "a specific
mental conclusion * * * to so abandon the right" shall be found in order to constitute an abandonment. Munsey v. Marnet Oil & Gas Co., - 199 S. W. (Tex.
Civ. App.) 686 (1917).
An examination of the case, however, shows that the
court merely intended to point out that the conduct of the lessee, taken in
consideration with surrounding circumstances, may establish the intention to
abandon.
27
Lease, as construed by court, was dependent for its continuance upon the
discovery of oil: Eaton v. Alleghany Gas Co., 122 N. Y. 416 (i8go). Similar
situation: Petitt v. Double-O Oil Co., 82 Okla. I3 (1921). Continuation of lease
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of "delay rental" by the lessee in lieu of drilling wells. The clauses
governing this subject differ in wording and in legal effect. Some
leases provide that the lessee shall drill a well within a given time or
pay the specified rental. These are termed "or leases."2 8 Under such
provisions it is held that the failure both to drill and to pay rental
does not ipso facto terminate the lease but that it does furnish justification of a forfeiture by the lessor. 29 Another type of instrument
provides that, if a well is not drilled within a certain period, the lease
shall become null and void "unless" the sum specified as delay rental
is paid. This is the so-called "unless lease." Some courts hold that
such a lease is automatically terminated by a failure to "drill or
pay."30 Other decisions go upon the theory that the lessee's default
merely gives rise to a ground for forfeiture.3' In a third form of lease,
the provision requires that the lessee shall "drill or pay" or the lease
shall be "null and void."32 Such a lease has been held to terminate
automatically upon the lessee's failure to search for oil or to pay rent.-3
In other jurisdictions, this has been adjudged merely a ground for
forfeiture. 34
Other provisions of the lease may be so phrased that their violation
either causes a destruction of the lessee's interest or affords a cause
for forfeiture." If the duration of the lease is stipulated as being "so
dependent on completion of well within one year: Texala Oil & Gas Co. v. Caddo
Mineral Lands Co., 152 La. 549 (1922): Similar situation: Southern Illinois
Gas
28 Co. v. Parsons, 308 II. 139 (1923).
For a discussion of the distinction between an "or lease" and an "unless
lease," see Northwestern Oil & Gas Co., v. Branine, 71 Okla. 107 (1918), 3 A. L. R.
344;
29 and see note in 4 4 L. P. A. (N. S.) 5o.
New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. Gaffney Oil Co., 134 Ky. 792 (3909); Trammel
Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Sarver, supra, n. 15; Cohn v. Clark, 48 Okla. 50o (3915),
L. R.. A. 19i6B, 686; Cherokee Oil & Gas Co. v. Melton, 67 Okla. 242 (1918);
Jackson
v. Twin State Oil Co., 95 Okla. 96 (1923).
30
"Under the contract, the forfeiture operated automatically
. Bray v.
Woodley, 162 Ark. 186 (1924); House v. Halton, 167 Ark. 649 (1925); Sparks v.
Albin, 195 Ky. 52 (1922); Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview Oil & Gas Co., 29 Okla.
719 (1911), 43 L. . A. (N. S.) 487; Mitchell v. Probst, 52 Okla. io (1915);
Eastern Oil Co. v. Smith, 80 Okla. 207 (1921); Ireland v. Chatman, 87 Okla. 223
(1922);

Garfield Oil Co. v. Champlin,

1O3

Okla. 209

(1924);

Smithy. Harris,

252

S. 31
W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 836 (1923).
Dill v. Fraze, 169 Ind. 53 (19o7); Risch v. Burch, 175 Ind. 621 (1911);
Kays v. Little, 1O3 Kan. 461 (1918), I A. L. P.. 674; Young v. Moncrief, 117
Kan. 698 (1924); Stephenson v. StitZ, - 255 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 812 (3923).
See also Perry v. Acme Oil Co., 44 Ind. App. 207 (19o9); and Epperson v.
Helbron, 145 Ark. 566 (1920).
nFor cases dealing with question of when rent is due, see note in is A. L. R. 604.
33
Chi-Okla. Oil & Gas Co. v. Shertzer, IO5 Okla. 111 (1924). See also Taylor v.
Hamilton,
194 Cal. 768 (1924).
34
MLcKean Natural Gas Co. v. Wolcott, 254 Pa. 323 (19t6); Clemenger v.
Flesher, - Tex. Civ. App. - (1916), 185 S. W. 304.
35
Failure to drill well as required; Haggart v. Wheeler, II6 Kan. 702 (1924);
Four Brotherhood Oil Co. v. Kelley, - Tex. Civ. App. - (1921), 235 S. W. 604.
Failure to market product; Buffalo Valley Oil & Gas Co. v. Jones, 75 Kan. 18

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
long as oil or gas is produced," or is expressed in similar phraseology,
cessation of production puts an end to the lessee's rights. 6
In all of these cases, the intention of the lessee to hold or to relinquish the lease is utterly immaterial. He may desire to retain his
interests thereunder, he may emphatically deny that any cause for
termination of his relation with the lessor exists, and he may strenuously resist any attempt to enforce such a termination; yet the
judicial decision of the question of termination or of forfeiture will
not be affected by his intention.3 7 In view of the immateriality of
the existence or absence of a purpose to keep or to relinquish the
lease, cases dependent upon these situations cannot be said to be
cases of abandonment.38
Of course, there may be cases in which there are present the elements of both abandonment and expiration or forfeiture of the lease
by its own terms. If the lease is to expire unless the lessee drills a
well or pays delay rental within a certain time, and he deliberately
fails to do either with the intention of giving up his legal rights, the
essential features of abandonment are present. 9 The act of abandonment is the failure to drill or to pay rent, and it is done with the necessary intention of relinquishment. The case is equally one of termination either by expiration or by forfeiture. 4 Likewise, if the duration
of the lease is depetident upon continued production of oil or gas, a
cessation of production with the intention of surrendering all claims
may properly be called a termination by abandonment as well as by
expiration of the term.' The same would be true of the breach of
42
any of the conditions of the lease made under similar circumstances.
But the intention must be an intention to relinquish all property in
the lease. It is not sufficient that the particular default be intentional, if the lessee's purpose is to hold the lease in spite of the default.43
(1907). Cessation of operations for specified period: Dittman v. Keller, 55 Ind.
App. 448 (1914); Pratt v. Hays, 19o Ky. 20 (1920). Failure to pay taxes within
3o days after notice: Gulf Production Co. v. Cruse, - Tex. Civ. App. - (1924),
258
S. W. 211.
2

3 Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 Fed. 854 (1922); Shenk v. Stahl, 35
Ind. App. 493 (1905); Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil & Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483 (1911)
38 L. .A. (N. S.) 134; Caylor v. Bankers Oil Co., xio Kan. 224 (1922); Warner

v. 3Kulp,
7

14

Kan. i18

(1923).

Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil Co., supra, n. 36.
conclusion of preceding subdivision.
"An intentional failure to pay as stipulated * * * may be treated as an abandonment
of the lease." Shaffer v. Marks, 241 Fed. 139 (1917).
40
See Harris v. Riggs, supra, n. 12.
41
See Sult v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., supra, n. 15; and Michaels v. Pontius,
78 Ind. App. 204 (1922). In these cases, intent to abandon may be, and
apparently is, "spelled out" from conduct.
4See Federal Betterment Co. v. Blaes, 75 Kan. 69 (1907).
USee discussion in preceding subdivision.
38
See
39
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Nevertheless, a number of cases speak of the conclusion of the lease
by lapse through its own terms or by forfeiture for breach of condition as constituting an abandonment, 4 even when there is clearly no
intentional relinquishment by the lessee.41 In other cases, there are
4
suggestions to the same effect. 1
This confusion of terms is probably due to the fact that, as pointed
out, there are situations which may properly be described as constituting either an abandonment or an expiration or forfeiture of the
lease. This being true, there is a natural tendency to overlook the
absence of the essential element of abandonment-the intention-in
these particular cases. It is submitted, however, that the failure to
distinguish between the two situations, as hereafter pointed out,
leads to undesirable consequences.
III
Another source of confusion is to be found in those cases which
present situations coming within the scope of the doctrine of implied
covenants in oil and gas leases. In the absence of express stipulations
governing the diligence with which the work of exploration, development, operation and protection against drainage is to be carried on
upon the leased premises, courts have imposed certain obligations in
these respects on the lessee, upon the theory that such obligations are
implicit in the relationship created by the lease. These are termed
44Harrell v. Saline Oil & Gas Co., 153 Ark. 104 (1922); Dixon v. McCann, 87
Okla.
109 (1922).
45
in Beatty-Nickel Oil Co. v. Smethers, 49 Ind. App. 602 (19i), a condition
requiring the drilling of a specified number of wells was violated. Intent to
abandon was conclusively absent. The lease was twice assigned, and one of the
assignees made preparations to operate the well upon the leased premises, but
was forbidden to do so by the lessor, who claimed that the lease was at an end.
In Rawlings v. Armel, 70 Kan. 778 (1905), the lease provided for payment of
rent if wells were not drilled and operated after six months from its date, on
penalty of forfeiture. Two dry holes were drilled, but no rent was paid and the
machinery, etc. was subsequently removed from the premises. Intention to
abandon seems clearly negatived by a subsequent sale of the lease. Nevertheless,
the court held that the lease was abandoned. It might properly be held that the
lease was subject to forfeiture for nonpayment of rent, and the court justifies
its decision upon that ground as well. In New State Oil & Gas Co. v. Dunn,
75 Okla. 141 (1919), the lease for ten years contained provision for drilling of
well in two years. This was not done and court declared this to be an abandonment. Intent to abandon seems clearly negatived by the lessee's position that
a proper interpretation of the lease would afford it the entire term of ten years
in which to drill the well. In Tucker v. Canfield, 276 Fed. 385 (1921), the lease
for as long as oil and gas found in paying quantities expired upon cessation of
production from well on premises. The court calls it abandonment, though
intent to abandon seems to have been lacking, since the lessee sought to excuse
his delay.

"6See Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, supra, n. 36; Buffalo Valley Oil & Gas.
Co. v. Jones, supra, n. 35; Lincoln Land Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Co., i09
Neb. 652 (1923); Burnett v. Summerour, - Tex. Civ. App. - (1921), 228
S. W. 1O13; Four Brotherhood Oil Co. v. Kelley, supra, n. 35.
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the implied covenants of the lease.47 Failure to comply with such
obligations does not, of course, depend upon an intention to give up
the lease. In most cases of this type, no such intention is present.
The lessee simply fails, for a length of time deemed unreasonable by
the court, to drill an exploratory well, or to develop the land after
the discovery of oil or gas, or to operate producing wells, or to protect
the underlying deposits from drainage by wells on adjoining land.
This nonaction occurs because the lessee conceives that he will make
more profit out of the lease in that way. He does not intend to give
up the lease; he intends to use it in the way which will be most profitable to him.
If, because of the breach of these implied covenants, the lessor is
permitted to terminate the lease, 48 it is not proper to term the situation an abandonment by the lessee. The absence of the element of
intentional relinquishment prevents it from falling under that category. "There must be an intention to abandon as well as an actual
abandonment of the property * * *"49 Defaults in drilling the exploratory well,50 in developing the lease after the exploratory well is
drilled,51 in operating producing wells, 2 or in protecting the land
against drainageP do not, unaccompanied by an intention to give up
all rights under the lease, amount to an abandonment, although
they may constitute a breach of the implied covenants."
The distinction between termination of the lease by abandonment
and by forfeiture for breach of the implied covenants has, unfortunately, not always been kept in mind. As in cases of the type discussed
in the preceding subdivision, there may be instances wherein the acts
which constitute a breach of the implied covenants, if done with the
requisite intention, amount also to an abandonment. This seems to
have been the situation in an early Pennsylvania decision in which
the lease, after seven years delay in development, was said to be
47
The writer has dealt at length with these obligations in a recent book. See
Merrill,
Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases.
8
4 Not all jurisdictions permit forfeiture of the lease for breach of the implied
covenants.
See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases, Secs.98-ioo.
49
McMillin v. Titus, 222 Pa. 5oo (I9O9).
5Stitz v. National Producing & Refining Co. - Tex. Civ. App. - (1923),
24751 S. W. 657; Phillips v. Hamilton, 17 Wyo. 54 (I9o8).
Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co. 260 Ill.
169 (1913); Advance Oil Co. v. Hunt, 66
Ind. App. 228 (1917); Cadillac Oil & Gas Co. v. Harrison, supra, n. 9; Trammel
Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Sarver, supra, n. 15; Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Whited,
supra, n. 8; Pierce v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., - Teax. Civ. App. - (1920),
225 S. W. 193.
2Strange v. Hicks, supra, n. 15; Wisconsin-Texas Oil Co. v. Clutter, supra,

n. 15.

"O'Neil v. Sun Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 167 (19o9).

5See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases.
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terminated by abandonment.5 There was no direct evidence of an
intention to abandon, but the delay, unexplained, occurred under
circumstances which justified an inference of such an intention.56
Certain language in the opinion, however, indicates a view that intentional relinquishment is not necessary to the abandonment of an
oil and gas lease provided there has been delay in exploration or
development. The court says:
"A vested-title cannot ordinarily be lost by abandonment in a
less time than that fixed by the statute of limitations, unless
there is satisfactory proof of an intention to abandon. An oil
lease stands on quite different ground. The title is inchoate,
and for purposes of exploration only, until oil is found. If it is
not found, no estate vests in the lessee, and his title, whatever
it is, ends when the unsuccessful search is abandoned."
The language quoted seems to constitute the fountain head from
which have flowed these decisions which confuse abandonment with
an enforced termination of the lease for failure to comply with obligations implied by the law.

57

The extent to which this confusion extends may be illustrated by
an examination of several typical cases. In Steel smith v. Gartlan,8
lack of intention to abandon is clearly apparent, for the lessee signified
his wish to retain the lease, pending the outcome of exploration upon
adjoining lands. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
quoted with evident approval the extract from Venture Oil Co. v.
Fretts which is quoted above and held the lease lost by abandonment.
In view of the absence of intention to relinquish the lease, it seems
clear that the court was really enforcing a forfeiture for breach of
the implied covenant for development. The opinion recognizes that
the same result could have been reached upon that theory 9 and it is
submitted that such theory is the only one upon which the case can
be sustained.
In ParishFork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co.,"0 it was held that the
lessee's failure for eighteen months to operate a well or do further
drilling constituted abandonment. Various circumstances negatived
&Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451 (1893).
6See
authorities cited in note 23, supra.
57See Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jennings, 84 Fed. 839 (1898); Steelsmith v.

Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27 (1898); Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co.,
51 58W. Va. 583 (1902), 59 L. R. A. 566.
See note 57, supra.
52"Nor can there be a different conclusion if it is held that the lease, being for
the purpose of operating for oil and gas, is subject to the implied precedent
condition*** that the lessee shall diligently prosecute the search and operation
*6*." Steelsmith v. Gartlan, sura,n. 57.
Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., supra, n. 57.
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the existence of any intention to give up the lease. 61 The court by
its language definitely showed that it considered the question of
intention immaterial:
"It is by no means conclusive of the question of abandonment
that the lessees insisted that their lease was not forfeited, that
there were some circumstances which rendered it inconvenient
for them to continue the work of exploration, and that Cox
made some effort to have the defective title of Swisher perfected.
All this is consistent with the intention to continue the work of
exploration, but it is equally consistent with the intention
merely to endeavor to hold onto the lease without doing any
work under it,-a thing which the policy of the law does not
permit unless the right to do so is absolutely fixed and secured
by the terms of the contract; and even then it is not always
permitted."
At another point the court spoke of the lessees as "simply trying
to hold the lease without doing anything under it, * * * " But, as we
have seen, 2 an intention to hold the lease without working the
premises does not constitute an intention to abandon all property in
it. The court appears plainly to have been enforcing a forfeiture of
the lease for a breach of the implied covenants for operation and for
development, though calling the result an abandonment.
In Bay State PetroleumCo. v. Penn L ubricatingCo.,6 it was expressly
found that the lessee did not intend to abandon the premises, yet
the court held that the lease came to an end by abandonment upon
the failure of the.lessee to continue the search for oil or gas. An early
case in the Federal Courts, arising in West Virginia, shows the same
confusion between abandonment and judicial termination of the
lease as a remedy for the breach of an implied covenant.
The same
65
comment is applicable to decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas
and of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York."
"The lessees contended that no further work on their part was necessary to hold
the lease; steps were taken by them to secure further drilling; the lessees asked
the correction of a defect in the lessor's title to part of the land; and in various
negotiations between the lessor and the lessees, the latter uniformly contended
that the lease was in full force and effect.
62See
cases cited in note 18, supra.
3
DBay State Petroleum Co. v. Penn Lubricating Co., 121 Ky. 637 (1905).
See also Hails v. Johnson, 204 Ky. 94 (1924).

64Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jennings, supra, n. 57, affirmed sub norn. Foster v.
Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co., 9o Fed. (W.Va.) 718 (1898). See also Logan Natural Gas
& Fuel Co. v. Great Southern Gas & Oil Co., 126 Fed. 623 (1903).
65Grubb v. McAfee, supra, n. 15. The case may be upheld upon the theory
that long delay in development raised a presumption of intention to abandon
which was not rebutted by any evidence offered in behalf of the lessee. The court's
opinion, however, seems to go further and to hold that the failure to develop
constituted
abandonment "as matter of law."
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Conkling v. Krandusky, 127 App. Div. (N. Y.) 761 (I9O8).
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So far has this lack of discrimination prevailed that it has been
declared that there is no real difference between abandonment of an
oil and gas lease and forfeiture thereof for breach of an implied covenant,67 while several cases specifically state that such a breach constitutes an abandonment by the lessee, for example:68
"* * * if it was the duty of appellee to drill a protection well and
it refused to do this, its refusal would constitute an abandonment of the contract. * * ,"69
"If after drilling a well in which there is oil or gas the lessee
goes away and leaves it for an unreasonable length of time
without an effort to further develop the lease or market the oil,
it will amount to an abandonment of the lease unless the lease
is kept in force by the payment of rentals or in some other
way
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"*** there is an implied obligation on the lessee to proceed
with the exploration and development of the land, with reasonable diligence, according to the usual course of the business, and
a failure to do so amounts to an abandonment which will sustain
a re-entry by the lessor." 7'
"When a lessee undertakes to develop oil or gas land on a
royalty or rental basis and the contract does not specify the
number of wells to be drilled, there is an implied obligation
that he will fully develop the land with reasonable diligence,
and a 72failure to do so amounts to an abandonment of the
lease."
In spite of these declarations, it must be apparent that there is a
real and important difference between the abandonment of a lease
and forfeiture thereof for breach of an implied covenant. For the
former to exist, it is necessary that the lessee intend to relinquish all
his rights under the lease, and that he act in pursuance of this intention. In the case of forfeiture, intention to give up the lease does not
exist; the law permits the lessor to terminate the relationship against
the will of the lessee because of the latter's failure to fulfill the obligations which the law imposes upon him. It is believed that the authorities heretofore cited, as well as the general rules of law governing the
doctrine of abandonment, sustain this distinction.
67 "That the rights of the lessee may be lost by abandonment is evident. This
is practically the same thing as a breach of the implied covenant on the part
of the
lessee to use diligence in sinking a well." Hall v. McClesky, supra, n. 13.
G8See, in addition to the cases from which extracts are quoted, Harris v. Michael,
supra,
n. 19.
6709Blair v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 3o0 (1921), I9 A. L. R. 430.
Monarch Oil & Gas Co. v. Hunt, 193 Ky. 201 (1921). Intent to abandon was
nonexistent, as the lessee took the position that it "was only waiting for an
opportunity to market its oil," and was not required to engage in further
development
until a market was secured.
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Aye v. Philadelphia Co., supra, n. i9.
7
2Chapman v. Ellis, 254 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 615 (1924).
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IV
Without doubt it is pertinent to ask: What is the profit of all this
discussion? "What's in a name?" If correct results are'reached, why
quibble over the terms to be applied to the process of reasoning from
which they come? It seems to the writer that the indiscriminate use
of the term abandonment to apply to each of the three situations
which have been discussed produces consequences which are undesirable. Some of the more important of these warrant a brief
consideration.
The legal consequences which flow from characterizing a given
situation as abandonment or as something else are often quite distinct. Thus, if the breach of an agreement to drill a well or to pay
delay rental be regarded merely as giving rise to a ground of forfeiture of the lease, equity may relieve the lessee from his liability to
that penalty, upon proper showing.n On the other hand, an "abandoniment" operates immediately to divest the lessee of his rights
under the lease.7 4 There is therefore, it would seem, no basis for
judicial relief against its effects. Hence, the lessee's position is much
less favorable when conduct of this sort is called "abandonment,"
than if it be deemed merely a cause for the assertion of a forfeiture
by the landowner, and his rights may vary upon exactly similar
states of fact, depending upon which tag the court places upon the
particular case.
In some states, forfeiture of the lease is not regarded as a proper
remedy for the breach of an implied covenant.7 5 The lessor in such
jurisdictions is remitted to the remedy of recovery of damages for
such a breach. But, if the facts which constitute a breach of the implied covenants are also looked upon as amounting to an abandonment by the lessee which terminate his rights under the lease, the
lessor gets the same practical result that he would obtain in a jurisdiction which regards forfeiture as a proper remedy for a breach of
covenant. The relief available to him may thus depend upon whether
or not his counsel is astute enough to assert the existence of an abandonment 76 when the lessee has been remiss in drilling or in operating
wells. Here, again, the label which is judicially affixed to the case at
bar may have much to do with the actual rights of the parties.
3
7Kays v. Little, supra, n. 31; McKean Natural Gas Co. v. Wolcott, supra,
n. 34; Shaffer v. Marks, supra, n. 39.; Brunson v. Carter Oil Co., 263 Fed.'

(Okla.) 935 (1919).

74See Harris v. Riggs, supra, n. 12; Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, supra, n. 55;
Wisconsin-Texas Oil Co. v. Clutter, supra, n. 15.
75See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases, See. 98, and cases
there
6 cited.
7 See Grubb v. McAfee, supra, n. 15; Chapman v. Ellis, supra,n.
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It is to be remembered, also, that describing implied covenant
situations as cases of abandonment tends to hinder the proper
development of the former doctrine. Precedents labeled "abandonment" may easily be cast aside as inapplicable by counsel and by
judges who realize that the case under their consideration contains
no hint of intentional relinquishment of his rights by the lessee.
Makers of digests and other aids to the practitioner may likewise
accept the label at its face value in marshalling the authorities into
the proper pigeonholes. Hence the accurate solution of problems
arising under the doctrine of implied covenants may be imperiled
by the failure to discover and present what are often the most
significant decisions upon the particular situation involved.
Of course, in these days, we justly condemn that way of thinking
which attributes to legal conceptions, kept rigidly distinct each from
77
the other and mechanically applied, a virtue in and of themselves;
but such a slurring over of the lines between distinct doctrines as we
find in the situations under discussion cannot be other than harmful.
Its effect is to hinder the logical and consistent development of the
rules, principles and standards peculiar to each doctrine and thus to
curtail that certainty and predicability which is one of the chief
merits of justice administered according to law.7 8 It is to be hoped
that, as time goes on, the tendency to confuse cases of these three
classes will be overcome and that the term abandonment will be
reserved for situations which involve an intentional relinquishment
of his rights by the lessee.
"7See Roscoe Pound, "Justice According to Law," 13 Col. L. Rev. 696, 709.
78See Roscoe Pouhd, "The Theory of Judicial Decision," 36 Har. L. Rev. 802.

817ff.

